SimSup's Loop: A Control Theory Approach to Spacecraft Operator Training by Owens, Brandon Dewain & Crocker, Alan R.
   978-1-4799-5380-6/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE 
 1 
SimSup’s Loop: A Control Theory Approach to Spacecraft 
Operator Training 
Brandon D. Owens 
Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Mail Stop 240-2 
Moffett Field, CA  94035 
650-604-0037 
brandon.d.owens@nasa.gov 
Alan R. Crocker 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Mail Stop 241-20 




Abstract—Immersive simulation is a staple of training for 
many complex system operators, including astronauts and 
ground operators of spacecraft. However, while much has been 
written about simulators, simulation facilities, and operator 
certification programs, the topic of how one develops 
simulation scenarios to train a spacecraft operator is relatively 
understated in the literature. In this paper, an approach is 
presented for using control theory as the basis for developing 
the immersive simulation scenarios for a spacecraft operator 
training program. The operator is effectively modeled as a high 
level controller of lower level hardware and software control 
loops that affect a select set of system state variables.  
Simulation scenarios are derived from a STAMP-based hazard 
analysis of the operator’s high and low level control loops. The 
immersive simulation aspect of the overall training program is 
characterized by selecting a set of scenarios that expose the 
operator to the various inadequate control actions that stem 
from control flaws and inadequate control executions in the 
different sections of the typical control loop. Results from the 
application of this approach to the Lunar Atmosphere and 
Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) mission are provided 
through an analysis of the simulation scenarios used for 
operator training and the actual anomalies that occurred 
during the mission. The simulation scenarios and inflight 
anomalies are mapped to specific control flaws and inadequate 
control executions in the different sections of the typical 
control loop to illustrate the characteristics of anomalies 
arising from the different sections of the typical control loop 
(and why it is important for operators to have exposure to 
these characteristics). Additionally, similarities between the 
simulation scenarios and inflight anomalies are highlighted to 
make the case that the simulation scenarios prepared the 
operators for the mission. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Immersive simulation—the act of practicing operational 
scenarios in mock environments that closely mimic (and 
usually utilize actual elements of) the operational 
environment—is an often used and well respected tool for 
training individuals for complex operations like spaceflight, 
aviation, power plant operations [1], industrial chemical 
processing [2], and medical surgery [3]. In the realm of 
government funded human and robotic spaceflight, 
immersive simulation is usually a flight readiness 
requirement. Moreover, simulation scenario developers are 
often praised in astronaut [4,5] and ground operator 
memoirs [6-8], and immersive simulations are even 
dramatized in fiction and non-fiction movies and television 
series such as Apollo 13 and From the Earth to the Moon.  
In other words, effective immersive simulation scenarios 
and their developers are highly valued in complex system 
operations in general and in spaceflight in particular. 
 
The literature describing simulators, simulation facilities, 
and simulations for the purpose of engineering analysis is 
extensive. In fact, the AIAA holds its annual Modeling and 
Simulation Technologies Conference to promote research in 
those areas. Moreover, the topics of learning and training 
are widely researched and documented. Multiple 
publications offering high level overviews of astronaut and 
spacecraft ground operator certification programs, for 
instance, have been released since the 1960s [9-12]. 
However, these publications do not provide an explicit 
model for developing simulation scenarios to train 
spacecraft operators. 
 
In practice, simulation scenarios for spacecraft operator 
training are often based on what could be called the 
Procedure Model. Under the Procedure Model, the 
simulation scenario is developed in order to give the trainee 
an opportunity to execute specific nominal and contingency 
procedures. Underlying the Procedure Model is the notion 
that the procedures—which are usually developed with 
significant forethought and input from the operational 
community—will be the primary tools for guiding the 
operator through an operations experience and therefore, the 
operator should develop a great deal of familiarity with 
them.   
 
While it is undeniable that spacecraft operators need to be 
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adept at executing procedures, overreliance on the 
Procedure Model can have several drawbacks. First, the 
procedures have to be written to correctly cover the 
operational scenarios as exhaustively as possible and 
operators have to participate in numerous simulations to 
practice each variant of each procedure. Second, no matter 
how complete the procedures may be, the unknown 
unknowns of spaceflight will create situations that are not 
covered well by the procedures and thus the operator will 
have to improvise.   
 
For these reasons, some have advocated for a shift from 
“task-based” to “skills-based” training [12].  Moreover, 
spacecraft simulation scenario developers often try to go 
beyond the scope of the Procedure Model.  However, their 
efforts in this regard are widely considered an art form and 
left unformalized, thus creating a gap in our knowledge of 
how to repeatedly develop simulation scenarios that go 
beyond the Procedure Model.   
 
Accordingly, in this paper the authors propose a formalized 
model for spacecraft simulation scenario development to 
complement the Procedure Model. This model treats 
spacecraft operators as controllers of control loops with 
generalizable elements that can each be the source of a 
disruption that opens the control loop. Underlying this 
model is the notion that exposing operators to disruptions in 
these general elements and allowing them to go through the 
action closing the loop in immersive simulations provides 
them with foundational experience to help them improvise a 
solution when the counterparts to these elements in other 
control loops are disrupted.   
 
In the next section, the fundamental concepts of control 
theory and their applicability to complex systems operations 
are presented. Then in Section 3, an accident model based 
on control theory and its associated hazard analysis process 
are summarized to establish a connection between control 
theory, system safety, system security, and the role of the 
complex system operator. In Section 4, SimSup’s Loop, an 
approach to immersive simulation scenario development 
based on control theory is detailed with examples from the 
application of this approach to the Lunar Atmosphere and 
Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) mission [13-21]. This 
description of SimSup’s Loop is then followed up by a 
discussion—featuring a case study of actual inflight 
anomalies during the LADEE mission—of its effectiveness 
as a training approach. Finally, the paper ends with 
concluding remarks and comments on the potential for 
future work in the application of SimSup’s Loop to complex 
system operator training. 
 
2. CONTROL THEORY CONCEPTS  
Control theory is applied to technical, social, and economic 
problems in order to influence the behavior of engineered 
systems, often with the explicit recognition that the 
operating conditions and environments of these systems will 
not be exactly known by the control system designer. As 
stated in [22]: 
“The central problem in control is to find a technically 
feasible way to act on a given process so that the 
process adheres, as closely as possible to some desired 
behavior. Furthermore, this approximate behavior 
should be achieved in the face of uncertainty of process 
and in the presence of uncontrollable external 
disturbances acting on the process.” 
In the remainder of this section, the key control theory 
concepts needed to understand why one would apply control 
theory to complex system operator training are detailed. 
System State Variables 
A system’s state variables are changeable conditions of the 
system (e.g., pitch of an airplane, velocity of a car, etc.) that 
determine the system’s evolution over time (i.e., its dynamic 
behavior). Thus, the ability to deliberately affect the system 
state variables is the ability to control its dynamic behavior.   
The values of system state variables can be discrete (e.g., 
the mode of a spacecraft) or continuous (e.g., the cabin 
pressure of a space station). In principle, they are 
measureable (e.g., temperature), but direct measurement of 
them can be practically impossible (e.g., the total number of 
people with infected with a specific disease). While it is 
common for control theorists and engineers to focus on 
system state as it applies to physical (i.e., 
electromechanical) systems, the concept of system state can 
also apply to biological, economic, and social systems [23]. 
The Control Loop 
The control system (also referred to as the control structure 
or control loop) is a system of logical and physical elements 
that convert an input describing the desired system state into 
actions upon the system to be controlled that are intended to 
achieve or maintain the goal. According to [24], there are 
three fundamental elements of control systems:  controllers, 
actuators, and observers. The controller is the logic of the 
control system (stored in electronics, human minds, 
regulations, procedures, etc.) that determine the control 
actions. The controller contains (or implicitly assumes) a 
model of the controlled system. The actuator is the physical 
object (e.g., reaction wheel) or agent that imposes the intent 
of the controller on the system by executing the control 
action. The observer is the element of the control system 
(e.g., electromechanical sensor and estimation logic, human 
operator, etc.) that ascertains the system state. 
Control systems can take two basic forms: open-loop or 
closed-loop (also called feedback). In an open-loop control 
system, the observer is completely passive or non-existent.  
In a closed-loop control system, the observer actively 
monitors the system state during the control actions and 
feeds that information back to the controller so that it may 
alter its instructions to the actuator(s). The advantage of 
closed-loop control over open-loop control is that it can 
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allow the control system to correct for uncertainties in 
controller performance, actuator performance, the controlled 
process, and the system’s operating environment. Effective 
open-loop control requires a large degree of certainty over 
these things prior to the control action (i.e., when the control 
system is designed and implemented). For complex systems, 
such a degree of certainty is not possible and thus, closed-
loop systems are implemented. Even control loops that are 
advertised as open-loop are often “closed” (albeit on longer 
timescales) when the boundaries of the control loop are 
expanded to include the human operators of the systems. 
Control Authority 
Control authority is a system property determined by the 
design of the control system that permits the ability of the 
control system to affect the system state. Control systems 
(both open- and closed-loop) employ their system’s control 
authority to achieve and maintain the desired system states.   
The three primary applications for applying a system’s 
control authority are: task (or procedure) execution, 
disturbance rejection, and adaptation. 
Task (or Procedure) Execution 
Task or Procedure Execution is the planned alteration of 
system state under an assumed system environment and 
goal. Task execution can sometimes be performed 
effectively with open-loop control, but there is a possibility 
for unanticipated and undesired interactions between system 
components and between the system and its environment 
during task execution. Due to this type of uncertainty, 
closed loop control can be—and often is—applied in task 
execution. 
Disturbance Rejection 
Disturbance rejection is the alteration of system state to 
nullify undesired changes in the system state caused by 
external (i.e., environmental) influences on the system. 
Disturbances are a source of uncertainty because they can be 
entirely unexpected or expected but not predictable (e.g., it 
is expected that lightning will strike a skyscraper, but it is 
not possible to predict when it will strike). Open-loop 
control systems can reduce the state changes caused by 
disturbances by adding sources of energy dissipation (e.g., 
physical barriers, damping, etc) and so forth. However, 
closed-loop control is usually needed to nullify the changes 
in system state once they occur. Thus, closed-loop control 
systems can often be far more effective than open-loop 
control systems in rejecting disturbances. [25] 
Adaptation 
Adaptation is the change of system structure or settings in 
response to changes in context or goals. System adaptation 
is a source of uncertainty in system operation because it is 
by definition not planned in the initial architecting of the 
system. Closed-loop control can allow the system to 
effectively employ its control authority to maintain desired 
system states in the response to the system adaptation. 
The Interplay of Task Execution, Disturbance Rejection, 
and Adaptation 
The three applications of control authority are not mutually 
exclusive and thus the design of a control system should 
often take all of them in account. As noted by [24], 
disturbances occurring during task execution may need to be 
rejected, control loops may have to be adapted to 
compensate for internal inconsistencies in system’s design 
or manufacturing, and control loops may have to be adapted 
to tolerate (or even take advantage of) disturbances. 
A human operator’s role in a controlled system 
Complex systems, such as spacecraft, usually have 
interactions (both internally and with their operating 
environment) that can only be understood during their 
operation. Additionally, the operating environment and the 
goals for the system can evolve during their operation. In 
order to effectively deal with these sources of uncertainty, 
an extensive amount of closed-loop control is necessary. 
However, building hardware and software closed-loop 
control into these systems is not always sufficient, 
particularly when the design of these systems have to be 
frozen prior to operations. Thus, it could be said that the role 
of human operators in complex systems is to close the 
control loops that could not be closed by the system design. 
Indeed, control theoretic models (such as the Crossover 
Model) are commonly used to analyze and design for human 
operator performance in such systems. [26] 
 
In some cases, operators must close control loops through 
supervision, guidance, and updating/upgrading of hardware 
and software control loops designed into the system. In 
other cases, they must close loops that the system designers 
explicitly intended for them to close. Finally, in other cases, 
they must close loops that designers never recognized by 
using whatever control authority they have at their disposal. 
In other words, complex system operators should operate 
their system with an understanding—at least on an implicit 
level—of the state variables that they need to control, the 
control authority that they have over those variables, and the 
different applications for that control authority (i.e., task 
execution, disturbance rejection, and adaptation).  
 
3. STAMP AND STPA  
In the previous section, the authors linked the role of 
complex system operators to control theory. In this section, 
the authors focus in on what operators—particularly 
spacecraft operators—attempt to control and provide 
background information on a model and analysis technique 
that can be applied to achieve such control. 
Safety and Security 
In most organizational structures, the operational objectives 
are generally determined by individuals (e.g., managers, 
politicians, customers, etc.) other than the actual operators. 
Additionally, many operators are often hired in the later 
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stages of the development and deployment of complex 
systems, after many of the goals for the system (i.e., its 
mission) are defined.  Thus, even though some operators can 
be (and should be) involved in setting mission goals, it 
could be said that operators are often handed a set of goals 
to achieve and any failure to achieve those goals can be 
considered a loss. 
Leveson [27] defines safety as, “freedom from accidents and 
losses.” NASA [28, 29] and the DoD [30] define safety 
similarly. Security is a closely related system property in 
that it is also related to freedom from loss events—albeit 
intentional loss events. [31] 
These broad definitions for safety and security and the fact 
that operators are expected to prevent pre-defined losses that 
narrowly scope their work suggest that system safety and 
security are the major (if not only) roles of spacecraft 
operators. This connection of safety and security to the roles 
of the operators—and the aforementioned connection 
between control theory and role of operators—raises the 
question of how one can control safety and security? 
STAMP 
The Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP) framework [32, 33] is an accident model that 
applies the control theory paradigm of system state 
management to safety. Hazards are defined in terms of 
unsafe system states, constraints are identified to restrict the 
hazards, and a safety control structure is created and 
operated to enforce the constraints. If a safety control 
structure is unable to enforce the constraints—due to 
ineffective design or adaptations within the system or in its 
environment—the system drifts into the hazard state, which 
would allow accidents or loss events to occur when certain 
uncontrollable conditions are present in the system’s 
operating environment.  
STPA 
The Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is an 
approach to hazard analysis based on STAMP. [33] It 
provides a generalizable taxonomy of inadequate control 
actions/executions and the flaws in the safety control 
structure that cause them. While the ultimate result of the 
analysis depends on the engineering expertise of the analyst, 
this taxonomy serves as a guide for the analyst to apply his 
or her engineering expertise to identify problems with the 
safety control structure in a more repeatable and complete 
manner.  
There are several ways to address problems with the safety 
control structure that are identified via STPA. Throughout 
all stages of system design—but in the early stages in 
particular—the results of STPA can be used to influence 
design decisions through safety-guided design processes. 
[33-35] Alternatively, if the problem is discovered when it 
is too late to be fixed in design or it otherwise must be 
accepted in the operational system, the knowledge gained 
from the STPA can be applied to operator training to 
mitigate the risk. 
STAMP, STPA, and Spacecraft Simulation Scenario 
Development for Operator Training 
It is sometimes said that hazard (or threat) analysis is like 
investigating an accident (or security breach) before it 
occurs. [33] A similar statement could be made about 
immersive simulation scenario development for operator 
training. The simulation scenario developer seeks to create a 
problematic situation—that can develop into a loss event—
that can be safely practiced (ideally before it occurs). In 
other words, opportunities abound for the use of hazard 
analysis techniques in the development of immersive 
simulation scenarios for operator training. 
With their system-level focus on loss prevention, STAMP 
and STPA are applicable to problems of safety and security 
[31], which are issues of major concern to spacecraft 
operators. Additionally their conceptual foundation is in 
control theory, which the authors argue is fundamentally 
connected to the role of human operators of spacecraft 
systems. Finally, operator training provides an area of 
application for knowledge derived from STPA when that 
knowledge cannot be applied to the system design. 
Therefore, in the next section, the authors present an 
approach for using STAMP and STPA in the development 
of immersive simulation scenarios for spacecraft operator 
training. 
 
4. “SIMSUP’S LOOP”  
As mentioned above, this section contains a description of a 
process for using STAMP and STPA for the development of 
immersive simulation scenarios for spacecraft operator 
training. The process culminates in the development of 
training curriculum for a spacecraft operator that consists of 
multiple immersive simulations that expose the trainee to 
issues arising in each of the general components of a control 
loop. The curriculum (i.e., SimSup’s Loop) is named after 
the generic control loop and the callsign used in many 
human and robotic spaceflight programs for the individual 
responsible for ensuring that the simulation achieves its 
objectives:  SimSup (shorthand for Simulation Supervisor). 
STPA can be applied at any stage of a system’s lifecycle 
[33] and is most effective at influencing the system design if 
it is applied in the early phases of the system’s design. Thus, 
it is possible that by the time that simulation scenarios need 
to be developed for operator training, an STPA would have 
already been performed and could be leveraged directly for 
the development of the scenarios. Moreover, the STPA and 
the design decisions influenced by it might have reduced the 
level of risk in mission operations, thereby reducing the 
requirements for operator training. However, for missions 
that are already in their operations phase or far along in their 
development without an STPA, there will be a need to start 
a new STPA on a mature operations concept. 
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Therefore, the steps laid out in this section are written in a 
manner that assumes that the simulation scenario developer 
is hired onto the mission several months before the start of 
the operator training campaign and that no prior STPA has 
been performed on the system. This assumption is in line 
with the manner in which operator training program was 
developed and executed for the LADEE mission. 
Accordingly, examples from the LADEE experience are 
provided with the description of each step. 
Step 1: Define the accidents (loss events) 
The initial step in the process is to identify the accidents or 
loss events in a general sense (i.e., without implicitly 
specifying the cause of the events). These loss events 
should—to the extent possible—cover a broad range of the 
concerns of the system stakeholders. For example, NPR-
8715C [28] identifies the following loss events of interest to 
NASA: 
1. General public death, injury, or illness. 
2. Astronaut death, injury, or illness  
3. Ground crew and other workforce death, injury, or 
illness. 
4. Earth contamination. 
5. Planetary contamination. 
6. Loss of, or damage to, flight systems. 
7. Loss or, or damage to, ground assets. 
The list of accidents used for the LADEE application—
shown in Figure 1—were heavily derived from an STPA 
conducted for the early conceptual design of an Outer Planet 
exploration mission [35] and should be applicable to a wide 
range of spacecraft missions.  
ACC1. Humans and/or human assets on Earth are 
killed/damaged (↓H4). 
 
ACC2. Humans and/or human assets off of the Earth 
(e.g., ISS, historic lunar landing sites, etc.) are 
killed/damaged (↓H5). 
 
ACC3. The payload data corresponding to the mission 
goals are not collected (↓H1). 
 
ACC4. The payload data corresponding to the mission 
goals is rendered unusable (i.e., deleted and/or corrupted) 
before it can be fully investigated (↓H2, H3). 
 
ACC5. An incident during this mission directly causes 
another mission to fail to collect, return, and/or use the 
payload data corresponding to its mission goals (↓H4, 
H5, H6). 
Figure 1. Defined system accidents for the LADEE 
application. 
Step 2: Define the hazard state variables 
The next step is to define the system hazards in terms of 
system state variables. These hazard definitions should be 
largely based on the accidents and should not take low-level 
aspects of the system design into account. As noted by [32], 
safety is an emergent property of systems that results from 
the interaction of system components and their environment, 
and it is therefore meaningless to define hazards in terms on 
the system components alone.   
Moreover, these definitions should describe conditions—
preferably controllable ones—rather than events. In 
STAMP, hazards are system states that can lead to loss 
events in certain system contexts. The occurrence of a 
system level hazard does not necessarily mean that a loss 
event will occur. 
Figure 2 contains the list of the hazards used for the LADEE 
application. Like the accidents in Figure 1, they too were 
heavily derived from [35]. 
H1. Inability of mission to collect payload data (↑ACC3), 
(→SC1). 
 
H2. Inability of mission to return collected payload data 
(↑ACC4), (→SC2). 
 
H3. Inability of mission payload investigators to use 
returned data (↑ACC4), (→SC3). 
 
H4. Exposure of Earth life or human assets on Earth to 
toxic, radioactive, and/or energetic elements of mission 
hardware (↑ACC1, ACC5), (→SC4, SC5). 
 
H5. Exposure of Earth life or human assets off Earth to 
toxic, radioactive, and/or energetic elements of mission 
hardware (↑ACC2, ACC5), (→SC6). 
 
H6. Inability of other space exploration missions to use 
shared space exploration infrastructure to collect, return, 
and/or use data (↑ACC5), (→SC5, SC6, SC7). 
 Figure 2. Defined hazards for the LADEE application. 
Step 3: Define the high-level safety constraints 
Once the hazards have been defined, the next step is to 
define the high-level safety constraints. These constraints 
should be defined to prevent the hazards from creating loss 
events. That said, the safety constraints should not over 
constrain the system by restricting any level of the hazards 
from occurring at any time. The overall list of hazards will 
likely create tradeoffs where some degree of a hazard may 
have to be accepted at certain times in order to prevent other 
hazards from occurring (e.g., data collection may have to be 
temporarily inhibited in order to perform a collision 
avoidance maneuver). Therefore, high-level aspects of the 
system design and the notions of accepted risks and risk 
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priorities can factor into the definition of the high-level 
safety constraints. 
The list of high-level safety constraints used for the LADEE 
application is shown in Figure 3. Once again, this list was 
largely derived from the early conceptual design of an Outer 
Planet exploration mission [35]. These constraints were 
primarily written to constrain system behavior during 
mission operations (additional constraints could be written 
to constrain the behavior during the other mission phases). 
Thus, the constraints related hazards H4-H6 simply relate to 
control of the launch vehicle and spacecraft trajectory, 
which must intentionally move along a collision course with 
Earth (and potentially human assets off of Earth) at certain 
times during the mission. 
SC1. The mission must have the necessary functionality 
for payload data acquisition at the required times (←H1) 
 
SC2. The mission must be able to return data at the 
required times (←H2) 
 
SC3. The mission payload investigators must be able to 
use the data from the mission at the required times 
(←H3) 
 
SC4. All physical elements of the mission must not 
unintentionally move along a collision course with Earth 
(←H4) 
 
SC5. All physical elements of the mission that 
intentionally collide with the Earth must not cause 
damage to humans or human assets (←H4, H6) 
 
SC6. All physical elements of the mission must not 
unintentionally move along a collision course with 
humans or human assets that are off of Earth (e.g., ISS, 
historic lunar landing sites, etc.) (←H5, H6) 
 
SC7. The mission must not deny usage of shared space 
exploration infrastructure to another mission if such a 
denial would jeopardize that mission’s goals (This 
constraint does not necessarily apply if the mission’s 
goals are similarly or more severely jeopardized) (←H6) 
Figure 3. Defined high-level safety constraints for the 
LADEE application. 
Step 4: Define the lower level safety constraints per the 
existing functional decomposition and design 
If one were to perform the process described in this section 
during the early stages of the design of the system or its 
operational concept, he or she would use the safety 
constraints defined in Step 3. However as mentioned above, 
the process described in this section is assumed to start 
shortly before operator training begins and thus, the system 
design and functional decomposition of operator roles are 
mature by the time Step 3 is complete.  Therefore, the next 
step is to evaluate the existing functional decomposition and 
design against the high-level safety constraints and 
accordingly define lower level safety constraints on the 
system operators.   
The lower level safety constraints ultimately trace back to 
the system hazards and should constrain the system further 
than the high-level safety constraints. Moreover, by this 
point in the process they should be detailed enough to be of 
direct interest specific operators—perhaps to point where 
they could become flight rules for the operator. As an 
example, the lower level safety constraints defined for the 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) operator in the 
LADEE application are provided in Figure 4. 
GNC-SC1. GNC must not permit excursions from 
acceptable maneuver attitudes during maneuvers (←H1, 
H4, H5, H6).  
 
GNC-SC2. GNC must distribute solar radiation exposure 
around the spacecraft’s surface by limiting the duration 
of time that the spacecraft spends in fixed attitudes 
(←H1, H2, H4, H5, H6) 
 
GNC-SC3. GNC must not permit excursions from 
acceptable communications attitudes when 
communications with the ground segment are desired 
(←H1, H2, H4, H5, H6). 
 
GNC-SC4. GNC must not permit excursions from 
acceptable payload attitudes during payload data 
collection opportunities (←H1) 
 
GNC-SC5. GNC must limit inertial loads due to angular 
acceleration on its components and the spacecraft as a 
whole (←H1, H2, H4, H5, H6) 
 
GNC-SC6. GNC must ensure that the operation of his/her 
subsystem components do not pose a non-justifiable, 
direct threat to other system components (←H1, H2, H3, 
H4, H5, H6) 
Figure 4. Defined lower level safety constraints for the 
GNC operator in the LADEE application. 
Step 5: Identify the state variables that can be used to 
evaluate whether or not the safety constraints are met 
With the lower level safety constraints defined, the next step 
is to identify the state variables that should be controlled to 
enforce the safety constraints. In doing so, the analyst 
should strive to only identify the state variables that directly 
lead to violations of the safety constraints if inadequately 
controlled. The state variables that are indirectly related to 
the violation of the lower level safety constraints may be 
identified in Step 7. That said, if the analyst deems other 
state variables to be important enough, it is possible to 
reiterate on Step 4 and revise the overall list of lower level 
safety constraints.  
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In order to enforce the GNC safety constraints in Figure 4, 
the GNC operator needs to maintain control of the 
spacecraft’s Attitude and the first and second time 
derivatives of it (i.e., Angular Velocity and Angular 
Acceleration). Additionally, the Reaction Wheel Velocities 
and Reaction Wheel Accelerations are a kinetic energy 
source that—if improperly controlled—could pose a threat 
to other spacecraft components. Finally, Workstation 
Functionality, Workstation Cleanliness, and Workstation 
Accessibility, are also of concern (particularly in regards to 
GNC-SC6), though it usually inappropriate to intentionally 
disrupt the control of the latter two state variables in an 
immersive simulation. 
Step 6: Identify the control loops affecting the state 
variables associated with the lower level safety constraints 
Step 6 calls for the identification of the control loops that 
control the state variables identified in Step 5. For each 
control loop, the analyst identifies the controller, actuator, 
and observer, and lists some high-level details about the 
control inputs, process inputs, control algorithms, and 
estimation algorithms. These details describe the control 
loops at a “black box” or block diagram level and do not 
necessarily delve into the detailed mathematics, coding, and 
electromechanical design specification used to implement 
the control loop.  The overall goal is to keep the description 
at a general level, so that the analyst can effectively apply 
the generic STPA taxonomy to identify inadequate control 
scenarios in Step 7. 
Figure 5 contains a description of one of the GNC control 
loops used for the LADEE application. This loop controlled 
the spacecraft attitude and it time derivatives and was 
automated on board the spacecraft.  However, it was closely 
supervised and guided by the operators on Earth who 
routinely updated its control inputs and on occasion updated 
its control algorithm and estimator algorithm. That human 
supervisory loop included control of the reaction wheel 
speeds through ground commanded momentum 
management maneuvers utilizing the reaction control 
system thrusters. It was also facilitated by other control 
loops that allowed the operators—including the GNC 
operators—to maintain basic workstation functionality, 
cleanliness, and accessibility.  
Step 7: Identify the potential causes for inadequate control 
of the state variables 
Once the control loops have been characterized, the analyst 
then applies the STPA taxonomy to identify scenarios in 
which the state variables associated with the lower level 
safety constraints are inadequately controlled. In the STPA 
taxonomy, there are four generic types of inadequate control 
actions [33]: 
1. A control action required for safety is not provided 
or followed. 
2. An unsafe control action is provided. 
3. A potentially safe control action is provided too 
early or too late (i.e., at the wrong time or in the 
wrong sequence). 
4. A control action required for safety is stopped too 
soon or applied too long. 
GNC-Control Loop 1:  
 
State Variables: Spacecraft Attitude and its time 
derivatives  
 
Controller: GNC control logic and S/C Fault 
Management logic 
 
Actuators: 4 Reaction Wheels and 4 Reaction Control 
Thrusters 
 
Observer: Star Tracker, Inertial Measurement Unit, 
Reaction Wheel Gyros, Course Sun Sensors, Reaction 
Wheel Speed Sensors, and Estimator Logic 
 
Control Algorithm: Modal with mode transitions dictated 
by ground command, stored command sequences, and 
S/C Fault Management logic 
 
Estimator Algorithm: Kalman Filter based for most 
modes and sun sensing logic for other modes 
 
Control Inputs: Stored command sequences, solar 
reference, and ground command 
 
Process Inputs: Electrical power, solar radiation, gravity 
gradient torques, thruster torques, RF link, thermal 
energy (from heaters)  
Figure 5. Description of a GNC control loop in the 
LADEE application. 
In performing the analysis, it is recommended to list 
customized versions of these inadequate control action 
statements for each lower level safety constraint. From 
there, the analyst then uses the STPA taxonomy of control 
flaws to identify potential problems that can arise in the 
control loop and cause an inadequate control action.  Figure 
6 [34] shows this taxonomy superimposed on the block 
diagram of a generic electromechanical control loop. In 
some cases, these control flaws may relate to controllable 
state variables that were overlooked in prior steps of the 
analysis and thus it may be necessary to reiterate Steps 4 
through 7 to analyze these control loops as well. 
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Figure 6. STPA taxonomy superimposed on a generic control loop [34].
Step 8: Define and execute SimSup’s Loop 
The inadequate control actions identified in Step 8—and the 
control flaws that can cause them—provide immersive 
simulation scenario developers with numerous cases upon 
which they can base their scenarios. However, it is likely 
that the analysis will yield far too many cases to simulate 
over the career of an individual operator—due to restrictions 
on the amount of time the operator can devote to training 
and potential limitations of the simulator(s). Thus, the 
scenario developer completes SimSup’s Loop by selecting a 
set of scenarios—conducted over multiple simulations—that 
each expose the operator to issues with different aspects of a 
typical control loop (i.e., control inputs, controllers, 
actuators, controlled processes, process inputs, disturbances, 
observers/sensors).  
The goal of SimSup’s Loop is to provide the trainee with 
exposure to as complete of a set of generalizable control 
system problems as possible. Accordingly, the minimum set 
of scenarios required to complete SimSup’s Loop can 
include cases related to any of the control loops in the 
operator’s domain, but not necessarily all of them. 
 
5. LADEE SIMULATION SCENARIOS AND 
INFLIGHT ANOMALIES  
The approach described in the previous section was used for 
simulation scenario development for the LADEE mission.  
However, due to the limited number of simulations in the 
LADEE simulation campaigns, it was not practical to 
complete SimSup’s Loop for an individual operator. Instead, 
the mission operations team as a whole was subjected to a 
SimSup Loop that targeted almost every part of the generic 
control loop several times. 
 In this section, many of the simulation scenarios from this 
SimSup Loop are grouped by the portion of the relevant 
control loop that they were intended to affect and are 
described at a very high level. Additionally, some of the 
actual in-flight anomalous scenarios that occurred during 
LADEE are described at a very high level, grouped by the 
portion of the relevant control loop that they affect.    
Control Input Issues 
The LADEE simulation scenarios involving control input 
issues include the following: 
1. Shortly before the end of a shift, the SimSup 
instructed the Command Controller to accidentally 
uplink the command that changes the spacecraft 
attitude control mode to Safe Mode. At the time, 
the controller was performing a task that required 
her to be prepared to send the command 
intentionally if a problem was to arise. The scenario 
forced the team to perform a somewhat lengthy 
recovery process—during odd hours—to restore 
science operations. 
2. During several simulations the SimSup forbid key 
operators from participating in certain parts of 
simulations (by telling them that they were absent 
due to illness or transportation issues). Doing so, 
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forced the operators to delay their control inputs or 
have someone else create the inputs. 
3. During a few simulations, the SimSup introduced 
various workstation issues that hindered the 
operator’s ability provide their control inputs to the 
processes that they were controlling. 
The control input issues encountered during the LADEE 
mission include: 
4. During the extended mission phase, one of the 
science instrument teams requested an increase to 
the duty cycle of their instrument. This increase 
resulted in several instances in which the 
instrument exceeded its thermal limits and shut 
itself off.  The instrument was not damaged and the 
instrument team accepted the risk of the instrument 
shutting itself off, but the incidents triggered 
anomaly response actions that had to be waived off. 
5. On a few occasions, the files that the operations 
team used to instruct the ground stations were 
improperly overwritten (i.e., the new file omitted 
the last contact from the old file).  As a result, the 
ground station missed the start of these contacts, 
leading to a lost opportunity to collect tracking data 
and the triggering of the anomaly response process. 
6. The voice communications lines between the 
LADEE Mission Operations Center (MOC) and the 
Deep Space Network (DSN) occasionally 
underperformed, making it difficult for the LADEE 
operators to provide real-time instructions to the 
DSN operators. These issues were similar to some 
of the issues described in item 3 above. 
Controller Issues 
The LADEE simulation scenarios involving issues with the 
controller of a control loop include the following: 
7. For a launch and spacecraft activation simulation, 
the SimSup introduced a sign error in the control 
algorithm for the reaction wheels—the sign axis for 
one of the wheels was mathematically inverted in 
the algorithm. When the reaction wheels initialized 
after the simulated launch, the affected wheel spun 
up to its top speed and forced the other reaction 
wheels to spin up to their top speeds. With this 
issue, the spacecraft could not control its attitude 
without operator intervention. 
8. For a lunar orbit insertion simulation, the SimSup 
attempted to mimic the effect of an inadequate 
thermal environment model by significantly 
increasing the lunar albedo and radiation in the 
simulator. During the lunar orbit insertion and each 
subsequent periselene in the simulation, spacecraft 
temperatures increased more than the operators 
expected that they would. 
9. When spacecraft maneuvers were simulated, the 
SimSup would often introduce varying levels 
maneuver execution errors (i.e., underperformance 
or overperformance relative to the operator 
predictions). These errors would force operators to 
update their maneuver performance models and 
potentially re-plan events following the maneuver. 
The controller issues encountered during the LADEE 
mission include the following: 
10. On launch day, the reaction wheel control 
algorithm treated a nominal reaction wheel 
behavior as an anomalous behavior and turned all 
four of the spacecraft’s reaction wheels off shortly 
after they were initialized.  With this issue—as was 
also the case with scenario 7 above—the spacecraft 
could not control its attitude without operator 
intervention. 
11. After lunar orbit insertion, the temperature of some 
spacecraft components exceeded operator 
expectations and flight rule limits, thus triggering 
operator intervention. The operator expectations 
were based on pre-launch analyses that did not 
account for all of the operating attitudes and 
transmitter duty cycles for the temporary orbit 
configuration between the first and second lunar 
orbit adjustment maneuvers.  
12. Every maneuver had a certain level of maneuver 
execution error [18]. None of these errors were 
severe and in general, the error levels decreased 
over the duration of the mission as the operators 
refined their maneuver performance models. 
13. The spacecraft’s flight software issued an improper 
function call during a laser communications session 
that caused LADEE’s flight computer to reboot. 
The reboot halted the laser communications session 
and placed the spacecraft in Safe Mode until the 
mission operations team could assess the spacecraft 
and command a return to normal Fine Pointing 
Mode operation. The software defect was identified 
and corrected in a flight software update performed 
during LADEE’s extended mission. 
Actuator Issues 
The LADEE simulation scenarios covering issues with the 
actuators of relevant control loops included the following: 
14. During a science operations simulation, the SimSup 
injected a short in the circuitry of a reaction wheel, 
causing that reaction wheel to power off. The loss 
of the reaction wheel significantly affected the 
control authority of the attitude control system and 
sent the spacecraft into Safe Mode. 
15. The SimSup started one simulation with the 
spacecraft in Safe Mode due to an inadvertent 
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reaction control system thruster firing that occurred 
out of view. Though the firing did not cause 
permanent damage to the thruster, it triggered 
automatic firings of the other thruster and 
ultimately sent the spacecraft to Safe Mode. 
16. During a launch and activation simulation, the 
SimSup initialized one of the reaction wheel with a 
significantly higher amount of friction than the 
other reaction wheels. The issue did not 
significantly affect the control authority of the 
reaction wheel, but raised questions about how to 
manage that wheel to keep it from degrading 
further. 
17. During a lunar orbit insertion simulation, the 
SimSup introduced a temporary overcurrent 
condition in the unit that actuated the thruster 
valves. The condition powered off the unit several 
minutes prior to the maneuver and had to be 
corrected in order for the maneuver to occur. 
Unlike many other spaceflight missions, the LADEE 
mission had no significant issues with the actuators in the 
control loops of interest to the operators. This result is likely 
due to the relatively short duration of the mission, the design 
of the spacecraft and instruments, preflight efforts to flight 
certify the mission hardware and performance of the launch 
vehicle. 
Controlled Process Input Issues 
Due to the numerous subsystem interdependencies on a 
spacecraft, it is often the case that an issue with one 
subsystem’s process outputs will affect the inputs to another 
subsystem’s processes.  For example, whenever the GNC 
subsystem was unable to control the attitude, the Thermal, 
Power, and Communications subsystems were deprived of 
the pointing inputs that were needed for thermal control, 
power generation, and closing the communication link with 
Earth, respectively. 
The LADEE simulation scenarios covering issues with the 
inputs of the controlled processes of relevant control loops 
also included the following: 
18. The SimSup provided simulated tracking data files 
to the orbit determination operators during some of 
the simulations, some of which contained corrupted 
data [21]. These data corruptions simulated issues 
(e.g., misconfigurations and other equipment 
problems) with the ground stations collecting the 
data and had to be identified and removed from the 
orbit determination data set (if they could not be 
corrected). 
19. During a launch and activation simulation, the 
launch vehicle imparted off nominal attitude rates 
on the spacecraft when it deployed it. The rates sent 
the spacecraft into Rate Reduction Mode, which 
uses the thrusters to reduce the attitude rates. They 
also affected the spacecraft’s communication link 
with Earth as the spacecraft rotated its antennas 
away from Earth.  
20. For several launch and activation simulations, the 
SimSup initialized the simulator with a state vector 
that simulated off nominal launch vehicle 
performance. These off nominal orbit insertions led 
to activity and maneuver replanning as well as 
problems with the spacecraft’s communication link 
with Earth. 
21. During several simulations, the SimSup degraded 
the performance of DSN, NEN, and SN 
communications assets or made them unavailable 
during critical times. The temporary issues with 
these assets degraded/removed an input to 
controlled processes that allowed for ground 
commanding and information   
The processes controlled by LADEE operators and the lower 
level control loops that they supervised were occasionally 
hindered with input issues, included the following: 
22. A Lunar Eclipse occurred during LADEE’s 
extended mission, depriving the spacecraft of a 
solar radiation input for several hours. The eclipse 
was predicted prior to launch and served as a 
launch constraint (LADEE had to launch early 
enough to complete its primary mission before the 
eclipse). The spacecraft was not designed to survive 
the eclipse, but the operators utilized their control 
authority over that spacecraft orbit, payload 
activity, and spacecraft mode to allow it to survive 
the eclipse. 
23. The ground stations providing tracking data 
occasionally provided files with corrupted tracking 
data. These instances forced the orbit determination 
team to identify and remove the data and work with 
to ground stations to identify and resolve the source 
of the data issues. 
24. Throughout the mission, communications assets 
were occasionally unavailable or improperly 
configured to provide telemetry at the expected 
times—similar to the scenarios described in item 
21. None of this incidents led to significant 
problems for the operations team. 
Disturbances to the Controlled Process 
The LADEE simulation scenarios involving disturbances to 
the controlled processes of relevant control loops includes 
the following: 
25. During a lunar orbit insertion simulation, the 
SimSup injected a radiation related upset event that 
rebooted the spacecraft. The timing of this issue 
necessitated a rapid operator response to manually 
start the maneuver.  
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26. Throughout the simulation campaign, the SimSup 
regularly injected radiation related memory errors 
(both single-bit and multiple-bit) into the 
simulations. The single-bit errors were 
automatically corrected by the memory scrub 
algorithm, but the multiple-bit errors each had to be 
evaluated for their criticality and addressed 
accordingly. 
The processes controlled by LADEE operators and the lower 
level control loops that they supervised were disturbed in 
several ways, including the following: 
27. Throughout the mission, a number of radiation 
related memory errors (both single-bit and 
multiple-bit) occurred in various areas of the 
spacecraft’s memory. [36] The single-bit errors 
were automatically corrected and each of the 
multiple-bit errors were investigated (none were in 
critical areas of memory). 
28. LADEE’s low altitude equatorial orbit created 
opportunities for conjunction with the Lunar 
Reconnaissance Orbiter’s (LRO’s) low polar orbit.  
A series of such conjunction opportunities posed a 
threat to both spacecraft and prompted LADEE to 
slightly modify its maneuver plan to increase miss 
distances between the two spacecraft. Interestingly, 
the SimSup planned this scenario for a simulation, 
but aborted it due to an issue that arose during that 
particular simulation. 
Controlled Process Issues 
In the absence of disturbances and issues with the inputs to 
the controlled process, there is still the potential for issues to 
arise in the controlled process. 
The LADEE simulation scenarios involving issues with the 
controlled process include the following: 
29. During a Science Phase simulation, the SimSup 
introduced a drift in the transponder oscillator 
output [21]. This issue resulted in varying delays in 
the ranging data, thus reducing the quality of the 
orbit solution. 
30. The SimSup initialized a couple simulations with 
damage to some of the spacecraft’s solar cells. 
Interestingly, the power system had excess power 
generation capacity for the mission phases being 
simulated and thus, the power control algorithm 
mostly kept the switches to these cells open. 
Because the switches the cells were only closed 
briefly during the simulation, this issue was very 
difficult for operators to detect this damage. 
Accordingly, the power system operators developed 
new analysis tools to diagnose damage to solar 
arrays. 
The controlled process issues that occurred during the 
LADEE mission included the following: 
31. Communications multipathing reduced the useful 
duration of communications sessions by interfering 
with command uplink capabilities. When the Earth 
was low on the lunar horizon, as seen from 
LADEE’s point of view, radio signals reflected off 
the lunar surface mixed with signals received 
directly from Earth. This mixing compromised the 
data content of the uplinked command and resulted 
in temporary loss of command capability. As 
LADEE’s orbit lowered, the intensity and duration 
of these effects increased. The team compensated 
by scheduling ground commanding at times in the 
orbit where multipathing was less of a concern. 
Observer/Sensor Issues 
The LADEE simulation scenarios covering issues with the 
observers—including sensors and estimator algorithms—of 
relevant control loops included the following: 
32. During a lunar orbit insertion simulation, the 
SimSup caused the star tracker to incorrectly sense 
overcurrent conditions and power itself off twice 
before the maneuver. The timing of this issue 
required a relatively quick operator response to get 
ultimately get the spacecraft into the proper 
maneuver attitude. 
33. During several simulations, the SimSup introduced 
various temperature sensor failures—some 
intermittent and others permanent. Several of these 
sensors fed state information to the control 
algorithm of heaters and thus required changes to 
the heater control inputs or control algorithms. 
34. For a launch and spacecraft activation simulation, 
the SimSup introduced a proportional bias in the 
readings of the speed sensor for one of the reaction 
wheels. This issue affected the ability of the GNC 
operator to estimate and control the spacecraft’s 
momentum state. 
35. During a lunar orbit insertion simulation the 
SimSup injected a temporary overcurrent condition 
that powered off the Inertial Measurement Unit 
prior to the maneuver. The issue affected the ability 
of the GNC system to control the attitude of the 
spacecraft during the maneuver. 
36. During one simulation the SimSup altered the 
reading from the antenna switch sensor to always 
indicate that the switch was in the Medium Gain 
Antenna (MGA) configuration. The impact of this 
issue once it was diagnosed was a slight 
degradation in operator situation awareness. The 
indication was not used in any automated control 
loops and other indications were available to 
determine the actual antenna switch position. 
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37. The SimSup initiated one simulation with an 
uncharacterized transponder delay [21]. Upon 
diagnosing this issue the orbit determination team 
updated the orbit estimation algorithm. 
The observer issues encountered during the LADEE mission 
include the following: 
38. Performance issues in LADEE’s star tracker caused 
it to output erroneous or stale attitude data to the 
flight software. The state estimator software 
interpreted these outputs as sudden jumps in 
spacecraft attitude, violating maximum attitude and 
attitude rate limits and forcing the spacecraft to 
enter Safe Mode. The mission operations team 
diagnosed this phenomenon and eventually 
uploaded flight software modifications to make the 
state estimator more robust in handling erroneous 
star tracker data. 
39. Output from two propulsion system pressure 
transducers was lost in the last few days of 
LADEE’s extended mission. Measurements from 
these sensors were normally used in ground 
software to predict thrust performance prior to 
firings for both orbit maintenance maneuvers and 
momentum dump events. Although alternative 
pressure measurements were available, the ground 
analysis tools had to be updated in order to use 
these alternative measurements. 
Summary of Control Loop Issue Locations 
The control loop locations of all of the issues described 
above are depicted in Figure 7. In this figure, the numbers 
associated with the issues mentioned above are placed over a 
generic control loop in the location in which they arose. As 
shown in the figure, issues—both simulated and real—arose 
from nearly every generic control loop location. 
6. DISCUSSION  
The use of SimSup’s Loop to train the mission operations 
team for the LADEE mission demonstrates the kind of 
results that can be obtained from using a hazard analysis 
based approach for simulation scenario development in 
conjunction with a Procedure Model for simulation scenario 
development. In this section, key lessons from the LADEE 
experience are discussed. 
The importance of disrupting each part of the control loop 
The examples provided in the previous section highlight 
how issues can arise in any portion of a control loop of 
interest to an operator in a spaceflight mission. Additionally, 
these examples qualitatively demonstrate that the signature 
of, impact of, and recovery options for an issue often relate 
to the portion of the control loop in which it arises. Table 1 
lists such traits—by the relevant control loop location—that 
were demonstrated during LADEE experience. These results 
support the claim that a well-rounded spacecraft operator 
training program should instill an appreciation of issues 
originating from every portion of a typical control loop 
(presumably through scenarios that provide the operator with 
experience dealing with such issues). 
Table 1. Traits associated with issues arising in different 




Control Input  The health of each control loop 
component may appear to be fine 
 Full recovery is sometimes possible with 
a correction to the control input 
Controller  The health of each control loop 
component may appear to be fine 
 Full recovery is sometimes possible with 
a correction to the control algorithm 
Actuator  The health and status of individual 
actuators is adversely affected 




 The health and status of multiple control 
loop components may be adversely 
affected 
 Application of control authority may 
mask the issue 
 Full recovery is sometimes possible with 




 The health and status of multiple control 
loop components may be adversely 
affected 
 Application of control authority may 
mask the issue 





 The health and status of multiple control 
loop components may be adversely 
affected 
 Application of control authority may 
mask the issue 
 Full recovery is sometimes possible if the 
disturbance can be endured/rejected 
Observer 
(Sensor) 
 The health and status of individual 
sensors is adversely affected 
 Degraded control authority or 





 The health of each control loop 
component may appear to be fine 
 Full recovery is sometimes possible with 
a correction to the estimator logic 
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Figure 7. The generic control loop locations of LADEE issues described in Section 5 (adapted from [34]).
Disruption of each part of the control loop could potentially 
be achieved through the use of the many hazard analysis 
techniques employed in spacecraft development and 
operations. Indeed, spacecraft simulation scenario 
developers often use a number of formal and informal 
hazard analysis approaches to complement the Procedure 
Model. However, without an explicit emphasis on disrupting 
each part of the control loop, such achievements would be 
serendipitous and presumably accomplished over a longer 
period of time due to redundancies in scenario design. 
Similarly, disruption of each part of the control loop could 
be achieved through the use of the Procedure Model, but 
only if the procedures are comprehensive enough to cover 
contingencies in each part of the control loop and there are 
sufficient opportunities to exercise all of the appropriate legs 
of the procedure tree. Such levels of procedural 
completeness have arguably been obtained in some 
historical, high-cost human spaceflight programs where 
hundreds of procedures—many with their own 
subbranches—have been written and operators have spent 
hundreds of hours practicing as much of the procedure tree 
as possible. However, lower cost missions cannot afford this 
level of completeness in procedure development and 
simulation. 
Moreover, the use of an exploratory approach to simulation 
scenario development could drive further development of the 
procedures. By trying to identify ways to disrupt a specific 
portion of the control loop without taking existing 
procedures into account, the scenario development could 
identify cases that warrant the writing of a new procedure. 
A total of 29 contingency procedures were developed in 
preparation for LADEE operations; these procedures 
focused on the identification of and response to sensor and 
actuator anomalies. In general, these procedures did not 
address other portions of the control loop. A Procedure 
Model approach to LADEE training would have only 
addressed sensor and actuator issues. 
 
In flight, LADEE experienced no actuator anomalies and 
few sensor anomalies. As cited above, many LADEE 
anomalies occurred in other portions of the control loop. 
Effective response to these anomalies required a skilled 
mission operations team that could quickly and accurately 
develop an understanding of unanticipated conditions. For 
example, the reaction wheel shutdown anomaly encountered 
during spacecraft activation (i.e., issue 10 in Section 5) 
presented a controller issue that had not been previously 
identified nor documented. Through use of the SimSup Loop 
method (particularly in the development of simulation 
scenario described as issue 7 in Section 5), the mission 
operations team had the opportunity to exercise the skills 
necessary for rapid identification of and response to such 
controller issues. As a result, the mission operations team 
was able to isolate and resolve the issue in a matter of hours, 
avoiding potential loss of mission on the first day of flight. 
Other more complex anomalies in controlled processes, such 
as the communications multipathing issues, required more 
time to assess and resolve, but the team’s ability to address 
these issues was potentially enhanced by experience gained 
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in simulations with other process anomalies. 
 
Testing versus Training 
The scenarios mentioned in the previous section comprise a 
portion of the total flight-like exercises that the LADEE 
mission operations team partook in to prepare for the 
mission. Many additional exercises took place with an 
emphasis on executing a planned activity and the 
expectation that no one would intentionally perturb the 
planned course of action for that activity. 
These exercises trained the operators how to execute 
operational procedures in an operational environment—
which is an essential skill for spacecraft operators. However, 
the goal of these exercises was often to verify that an 
operational product or process would work as planned. In 
other words, the exercises were more geared towards testing 
aspects of the operational system than training operators. 
Thus, one may choose to draw an explicit distinction 
between testing and training and apply the different models 
for simulation scenario development to each. The Procedure 
Model would be associated with the testing exercises and 
SimSup’s Loop (or another hazard analysis based approach) 
would be associated with the training exercises. Training and 
testing of the operational systems would be accomplished in 
both types of exercises, but the distinction would focus the 
preparation efforts and timing for these exercises. 
The Importance of “Freebies” 
Freebies are unplanned anomalies that occur during a 
simulation due to operator errors, oversights in the setup or 
operation of the simulator, ineffective operations procedures, 
equipment issues, etc. When presented with a freebie, the 
simulation supervisor must choose to make a declaration that 
the freebie is to be disregarded, restart the simulation, or 
allow the simulation participants to treat the freebie as if it 
were a real anomaly. 
Each of these options represents a departure from the 
original plan for the simulation or the realism of the 
simulation, and thus freebies can easily undermine the 
objectives of a simulation. However, if a freebie is properly 
managed, it can present several opportunities—hence the use 
of the term freebie, which implies getting something of 
value for free. First, freebies often have the same cause or 
effect as anomalies that can occur during actual operations 
and therefore, the trainee (or simulation supervisor) might 
obtain valuable experience working through the freebie. 
Additionally, freebies add a level of uncertainty to each 
simulation that can reduce the temptation to intentionally or 
unintentionally game the simulation. All simulations occur 
in a context that may give the trainee hints as to what 
scenario developer is planning for the simulation and that in 
turn could affect how the trainee prepares for the 
simulation—unless he or she deterred by the prospect of a 
freebie occurring. 
The opportunities presented by freebies can potentially 
complement an overall training program based on both the 
Procedure Model and SimSup’s Loop. Therefore, while it is 
important to keep freebies from becoming a distraction, they 
should not necessarily be dismissed in favor of the original 
simulation objectives when they occur.  
 
A number of freebies were encountered during LADEE 
simulations. The SimSup attempted to opportunistically 
leverage a portion of these freebies with varying degrees of 
success. In the interest of brevity, freebies were not 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
SimSup’s Loop is a control theory approach to developing 
simulation scenarios that train spacecraft operators to 
maintain control over two major aspects of their roles:  
safety and security. 
SimSup’s Loop was used in conjunction with the 
opportunistic treatment of freebies and the Procedure Model 
for simulation scenario development to develop the training 
program for LADEE spacecraft operators. The trainees were 
exposed to issues arising in every portion of the generic 
control loop and subsequently encountered issues arising 
from all but one generic portion of the control loop in flight. 
The similarities between specific simulation scenarios and 
actual issues encountered in flight were instrumental in 
helping the operators craft solutions to these issues. 
Moreover, the one generic part of the control loop that did 
not generate troublesome issues (i.e., actuators) was given an 
apparently disproportionate level of attention in the writing 
of LADEE’s contingency procedures. Consequently, the 
training provided in issues arising from other parts of the 
control loop provided operators with an experiential 
foundation to build upon in addressing the issues where the 
procedural foundation was lacking. 
 
8. FUTURE WORK 
Though SimSup’s Loop was successfully applied to LADEE 
spacecraft operator training, questions remain as to how it 
could be applied to other missions. Included among these 
questions are the following: 
 How does this approach to simulation scenario 
development compare with approaches based on 
other hazards analysis techniques? Do they lead to 
scenarios that cover the entire control loop? 
 Should the operator be taught the theory behind the 
development of the simulation scenarios (i.e., can 
the theory enhance the operator’s mental model of 
his or her responsibilities or could it be a 
distraction)? For the LADEE mission, the SimSup 
discussed—in passing—how he was disrupting the 
control loop during his simulation debriefs, but he 
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did not require trainees to explicitly demonstrate an 
understanding of the theory.  
 To what extent should the information derived 
from developing and executing a SimSup Loop 
feedback into procedure development? Should 
specific procedures be prepared for handling issues 
arising in each part of the control loop and if so, 
should these procedures leverage the SimSup’s 
Loop terminology? 
 What is the appropriate balance of scenarios 
developed via SimSup’s Loop and scenarios 
developed via the Procedure Model when only a 
small number of scenarios can be run? 
 To what extent should SimSup’s Loop be applied 
to security issues? For the LADEE mission in 
particular, the security aspects of spaceflight 
operations were not emphasized in order to focus 
on other priorities. However, other missions may 
have more resources (or specific concerns) to 
warrant an emphasis on security issues. 
 How can insights from the vast literature on 
learning and training be applied to analyze the 
effectiveness of SimSup’s Loop or derive answers 
to the questions above? 
An analysis of past missions can provide insight into some 
of these questions while future missions will provide 
opportunities to exercise different responses to these 
questions. However, the relatively low frequency with which 
spacecraft operator training programs are executed, and 
unique demands of each spaceflight mission will likely limit 
the ability to statistically demonstrate the efficacy of such 
responses. Therefore, engineering judgment will be required 
to evaluate these responses and determine how future 
spacecraft operators will be trained. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
The authors would like to thank all of the members of the 
LADEE mission operations and science operations teams. 
Among them, Peter Berg, Nathaniel Benz, Michael Logan, 
Scott Christa, John Costa, and Daniel Judnick helped set up 
and operate the simulators for the simulations discussed in 
this paper. Additionally, the following individuals played a 
significant role in planning the simulations:  David “Rusty” 
Hunt, Matthew D’Ortenzio, David Lung, Laura Plice, Sarah 
Hobart, John Bresina, Howard Cannon, Alisa Hawkins, Lisa 
Policastri, Richard Elphic, Tina Kelly, and Jennifer Sager 
Cosgrove. 
 
LADEE simulators were developed by Danillo Viazzo, 
Craig Pires, Fritz Renema, Karen Gundy-Burlet, Eleanor 
Crane, Pat Castle, Jesse Fusco, Douglas Forman, and some 
of the individuals who were already mentioned above. 
 
James Woodburn and Jens Ramrath from Analytical 
Graphics Incorporated created simulated tracking data for 
many of the simulations discussed in this paper. 
 
In order to independently test the spacecraft Fault 
Management System, the lead author attempted to develop 
simulation scenarios independent of the work done by the 
Fault Management Team. Nonetheless, the work of the 
team—led by Anupa Bajwa—was so comprehensive and 
influential to the mission operations concept that it 
undoubtedly influenced the simulation scenario development 
as well.  
 
The authors learned much about immersive simulation over 
their careers from the Spaceflight Training Division at 
NASA JSC and individuals elsewhere (namely Tom Regiec 
at Orbital Sciences, Victor Gehr at General Dynamics C4 
Systems, Kathryn Schimmels at NASA JPL, David Gaba at 
Stanford, and Brett Stroozas). 
 
Additionally, the authors extend thanks to the peer reviewers 
of this paper. Their comments improved the quality of this 
publication.   
 
This work and the LADEE mission was performed at the 
NASA Ames Research Center, under the Lunar Quest 
Program, and sponsored by the NASA Science Mission 
Directorate Division of Planetary Science.  
REFERENCES  
[1] M. Bronzini, S. Bruno, M. De Benedictis, S. Lamonaca, 
M. La Scala, G. Rotondo, and U. Stecchi, “Operator 
Training Simulator for Power Systems: training evaluation 
methodologies based on fuzzy logic,” 2010 IEEE 
International Symposium on Industrial Electronics 
Proceedings, July 4-7, 2010. 
[2] A. L. Ahmad, E. M. Low, S. R. Abd Shukor, “Safety 
Improvement and Operational Enhancement via Dynamic 
Process Simulator: A Review,” Chemical Product and 
Process Modeling 5, August 2010. 
[3] David M. Gaba, “The future vision of simulation in health 
care,” Quality and Safety in Health Care 13, i2-i10, 
October 2004. 
[4] R. Michael Mullane, Riding Rockets: The Outrageous 
Tales of a Space Shuttle Astronaut, New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster, 2006. 
[5] Thomas D. Jones, Skywalking: An Astronaut’s Memoir, 
New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006. 
[6] Christopher C. Kraft, Flight: My Life in Mission Control, 
New York, NY: Penguin Putnum Inc., 2001. 
 
  16 
[7] Eugene F. Kranz, Failure is not an Option: Mission 
Control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond, New 
York, NY: Berkeley Books, 2000. 
[8] Sy Liebergot and David M. Harland, Apollo EECOM: 
Journey of a lifetime, 2nd Edition, Burlington, Ontario, 
Canada: Apogee Books, 2006. 
[9] Donald K. Slayton, “Crew Functions and Training,” 5th 
AIAA Annual Meeting and Technical Display 
Proceedings, October 21-24, 1968. 
[10] Frank E. Hughes, “Simulation for STS Flight Crew 
Training,” 20th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting 
Proceedings, January 11-14, 1982. 
 
[11] David J. Forrest, J. Benton Christman, Mark Wiederholt, 
and Reynaldo R. Rodriguez, “International Space Station 
Part Task Trainers,” 1997 AIAA Modeling and Simulation 
Technologies Conference Proceedings, August 11-13, 
1997. 
[12] Gary Dittemore and Christie Bertels, “The Final Count 
Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller 
Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations,” 
AIAA SPACE 2011 Conference and Exposition 
Proceedings, September 27-29, 2011. 
[13] Butler P. Hine, Stevan Spremo, Mark Turner, and 
Robert Caffrey, “The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust 
Environment Explorer Mission,” 2010 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference Proceedings, March 6-13, 2010. 
[14] Matthew V. D’Ortenzio, John L. Bresina, Alan R. 
Crocker, Richard C. Elphic, Ken F. Galal, David R. 
Hunt, Brandon D. Owens, Alisa M. Hawkins, Laura 
Plice, and Lisa A. Policastri, “Operating LADEE: 
Mission Architecture, Challenges, Anomalies, and 
Successes,” 2015 IEEE Aerospace Conference 
Proceedings, March 7-14, 2015. 
 
[15] Arlen Kam, Laura Plice, Ken F. Galal, Alisa M. 
Hawkins, Lisa A. Policastri, Michel E. Loucks, John P. 
Carrico, Craig A. Nickel, Ryan L. Lebois, and Ryan 
Sherman, “LADEE Flight Dynamics: Overview of 
Mission Design and Operations,” 25th AAS/AIAA Space 
Flight Mechanics Meeting Proceedings, January 11-15, 
2015. 
[16] Nathaniel A. Benz, Danilo Viazzo, and Karen Gundy-
Burlet, “Multi-Purpose Spacecraft Simulator for the 
LADEE Mission,” 2015 IEEE Aerospace Conference 
Proceedings, March 7-14, 2015. 
[17] Lisa A. Policastri, John P. Carrico, Arlen Kam, Craig A. 
Nickel, Ryan L. Lebois, and Ryan Sherman, “Orbit 
Determination and Acquisition for LADEE and LLCD 
Mission Operations,” 25th AAS/AIAA Space Flight 
Mechanics Meeting Proceedings, January 11-15, 2015. 
 
 [18] Alisa M. Hawkins, Arlen Kam, and John P. Carrico, 
“LADEE Maneuver Planning and Performance,” 25th 
AAS/AIAA Space Flight Mechanics Meeting 
Proceedings, January 11-15, 2015. 
[19] Bryan S. Robinson, Don M. Boroson, Dennis A. 
Burianek, Daniel V. Murphy, Farzana I. Khatri, Jamie W. 
Burnside, Jan E. Kansky, Abhijit Biswas, Zoran Sodnik, 
and Donald M. Cornwell, “The NASA Lunar Laser 
Communication Demonstration—Successful High-Rate 
Laser Communications To and From the Moon,” 2014 
SpaceOps Conference Proceedings, May 5-9, 2014. 
[20] Howard N. Cannon, Anupa Bajwa, Peter P. Berg, and 
Alan R. Crocker, “LADEE Preparations for Contingency 
Operations for the Lunar Orbit Insertion Maneuver,” 2015 
IEEE Aerospace Conference Proceedings, March 7-14, 
2015. 
[21] James Woodburn, Lisa A. Policastri, and Brandon D. 
Owens, “Generation of Simulated Tracking Data for 
LADEE Operational Readiness Testing,” 25th AAS/AIAA 
Space Flight Mechanics Meeting Proceedings, January 11-
15, 2015.  
[22] Graham C. Goodwin, Stefan F. Graebe, and Mario. E. 
Salgado, Control System Design, Upper Saddle River NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 2001. 
[23] Katsuhiko Ogata, Modern Control Engineering, 3rd 
Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997. 
[24] Brandon D. Owens, Using phase space attractors to 
evaluate system safety constraint enforcement: Case study 
in space shuttle mission control procedure rework, Ph.D. 
Thesis, Engineering Systems, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2009. 
[25] Gene F. Franklin, J. David Powell, and Abbas Emami-
Naeini, Feedback Control of Dynamic Systems, 4th 
Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2002. 
[26] Ronald A. Hess, Pilot Control, in Pamela S. Tsang and 
Michael A. Vidulich (eds.), Principles and Practice of 
Aviation Psychology, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Publishers, 2003. 
[27] Nancy G. Leveson, Safeware: System Safety and 
Computers, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995. 
[28] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA 
General Safety Program Requirements, Washington, DC: 
NPR 8715.3C, 2008. 
[29] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA 
System Safety Handbook, Volume 1: System Safety 
Framework and Concepts for Implementation, 
Washington, DC: NASA/SP-2010-580, 2011. 
[30] U.S. Department of Defense, Standard Practice for 
System Safety, Washington, DC: MIL-STD-882D, 2000. 
  17 
[31] William Young and Nancy G. Leveson, “An Integrated 
Approach to Safety and Security Based on Systems 
Theory,” Communications of the ACM 57, 31-35, 
February 2014. 
[32] Nancy G. Leveson, “A New Accident Model for 
Engineering Safer Systems,” Safety Science 42, 237-270, 
April 2004. 
[33] Nancy G. Leveson, Engineering a Safer World: Systems 
Thinking Applied to Safety, Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2011. 
[34] Margaret Stringfellow, Nancy G. Leveson, and Brandon 
D. Owens, “Safety-Driven Design for Software-Intensive 
Aerospace and Automotive Systems,” Proceedings of the 
IEEE 98, 515-525, April 2010. 
[35] Brandon D. Owens, Margaret Herring, Nicolas Dulac, 
Nancy G. Leveson, Michel D. Ingham, and Kathryn A. 
Weiss, “Application of a Safety-Driven Design 
Methodology to an Outer Planet Exploration Mission,” 
2008 IEEE Aerospace Conference Proceedings, March 1-
8, 2008.   
[36] Gregory L. Limes and Karen Gundy-Burlet, “EDAC 
Events during the LADEE Mission,” 2015 IEEE 
Aerospace Conference Proceedings, March 7-14, 2015. 
BIOGRAPHIES 
Brandon D. Owens is a Senior 
Research Engineer for Stinger 
Ghaffarian Technologies, Inc at the 
NASA Ames Research Center. He 
has led the mission operations test 
campaigns (serving as “SimSup”) 
for two NASA missions (i.e., LADEE 
and NuSTAR) and served as the 
Deputy Mission Operations Manager for LADEE. He 
also supported mission operations for other NASA 
missions and programs (i.e., THEMIS/ARTEMIS, Gravity 
Probe B, the Space Shuttle, and the International Space 
Station) in various roles that he previously held at the 
Space Sciences Laboratory at UC Berkeley, the W.W. 
Hansen Experimental Physics Laboratory at Stanford 
University, and NASA Johnson Space Center. He has a 
Ph.D. in Engineering Systems from MIT, an M.S. in 
Aeronautics and Astronautics from Stanford University, 
and a B.S. in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering 




Alan R. Crocker serves in the Chief 
Engineer’s Office at NASA Ames 
Research Center. Previously, he 
served in several roles at the NASA 
Johnson Space Center. He has 
supported human and robotic space 
exploration projects as a systems 
engineer, flight controller, instructor, team lead, manager 
and instructor. For the LADEE mission, he formed and 
led the mission operations spacecraft engineering team. 
He received a B.S. in Aeronautical and Astronautical 
Engineering from Purdue University and is a graduate of 
NASA’s Systems Engineering Leadership Development 
Program. 
 
